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Abstract
In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a 
distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, accord-
ing to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is ex-
clusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of 
such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alterna-
tive-possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly 
grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence 
accounts of freedom (and moral responsibility) are motivated by a re-
flection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two 
pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen, threaten actual-
sequence accounts, including Sartorio’s. On the basis of her (rather 
complex) view of causation, Sartorio contends, however, that the two 
members of each pair have different causal histories, so that her view is 
not undermined by those cases after all. I discuss these test cases fur-
ther and defend my alternative-possibilities account of freedom.
Keywords
Alternative possibilities, actual sequences, robustness, Frankfurt 
cases, van Inwagen.
Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will is, in many respects, an ad-
mirable book. It defends a novel version of an actual-sequence view 
of free will, as opposed to an alternative-possibilities view. The dif-
ferent chapters hang together to form a rigorous and tightly struc-
tured web of arguments. Although my proposal about free will and 
moral responsibility differs from hers, nothing of what I write below 
should be read as contradicting this highly positive overall assess-
ment of this work.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the first two sections 
I present an outline of Sartorio’s account of freedom, according to 
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which freedom is exclusively grounded in the actual causal history of 
the choice or action, as well as a rough statement of my own view, 
according to which freedom is grounded, in addition to actual facts, 
in the agent’s access to alternative possibilities of choice and action. 
In the next section I question two very general assumptions of Sarto-
rio’s view. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom and moral respon-
sibility are motivated by a reflection on Frankfurt cases, which are 
characterized in the next section. These cases seem to show that 
alternative possibilities are not relevant to an agent’s freedom and 
moral responsibility. The next two sections start a discussion of 
some test cases, especially two pairs of examples, originally designed 
by van Inwagen, which threaten actual-sequence accounts, including 
Sartorio’s, in that both members of each pair seem to share causal 
histories while differing in the agent’s freedom and moral responsi-
bility. On the basis of her (rather complex) view of causation, which 
includes the assumption that causes make a difference to their ef-
fects, Sartorio contends, however, that the two members of each pair 
have different causal histories, so that her view is not actually refuted 
by those cases after all. In the remaining sections, I discuss these 
test cases further and defend my alternative-possibilities account of 
freedom. Though I agree with Sartorio that ‘causes’ make a differ-
ence to their effects, I contend that the difference they make is a 
difference in the kind of action that the agent performs in each case, 
and therefore a difference that involves alternative ways of choosing 
and acting. I argue that our judgments about agents’ freedom and 
responsibility for their choices and actions are fueled, not only by 
facts pertaining to the actual sequence, but also by the assumption 
that the agent could have done otherwise. In cases of blameworthi-
ness, we assume that the agent could have done better from a moral 
point of view.
Two conflicting accounts of freedom
According to an actual-sequence view of free will, an agent’s access 
to alternative choices and actions is not required for her to choose 
and act freely and, with some additional cognitive constraints, to 
be morally responsible for those choices, actions, and consequences 
thereof. This is Sartorio’s characterization of such an actual-sequence 
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account of freedom: ‘When agents are free, their freedom is ground-
ed only in facts pertaining to the actual processes or sequences of 
events issuing in their behavior’ (p. 9).1
In contrast, an alternative-possibilities account insists that an 
agent has to be able to decide or do otherwise in order to choose and 
act freely and to be morally responsible for such choices and actions. 
Here is Sartorio’s brief presentation of this view: ‘When agents are 
free, their freedom is grounded, at least partly, in the fact that they 
are able to do otherwise’ (p. 9).
Since it is very natural to hold that determinism excludes an 
agent’s access to alternative possibilities (though of course not her 
belief that she has that access),2 an actual-sequence view is a natural 
ally of compatibilism, the view that determinism as such does not 
exclude free will and/or moral responsibility. Compatibilism is, in 
fact, Sartorio’s explicit stance concerning the venerable question of 
the relationship between determinism, on the one hand, and free 
will and/or moral responsibility, on the other.
My main aim in this paper is to defend an alternative-possibilities 
(AP) approach to freedom and moral responsibility, in an incom-
patibilist (in fact, libertarian) spirit. A reasonable AP account, as I 
hope mine is, holds that open alternative possibilities are a require-
ment of free will, a necessary condition of it, but not a sufficient, let 
alone a necessary and sufficient condition. An AP view is perfectly 
consistent with the assumption that, in addition to open alternative 
possibilities, there are other necessary conditions for free will, many 
of which can and will pertain to the actual sequence that issues in the 
agent’s choice and action.
Sartorio is, of course, aware of this theoretical position, which is 
in fact occupied by several contemporary theorists.3 As she writes, 
1 Unless otherwise stated, all pages refer to Sartorio 2016.
2 Natural as the incompatibility between determinism and alternative possi-
bilities may be, it has not gone unchallenged. According to a conditional concep-
tion of alternative possibilities (Hume 1748/1975, Moore 1912), agents are able 
to do otherwise even if determinism is true. In contrast, an important argument 
for the incompatibility between determinism and alternative possibilities is the 
so-called Consequence Argument (van Inwagen 1983).
3 Robert Kane (1996), a leading libertarian theorist, defends this position. 
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‘[I]t is common for theorists who claim that freedom is grounded 
in alternative possibilities to also claim that freedom is grounded in 
facts about the actual sequence’ (p. 19). This is in fact my own posi-
tion. I need not deny, then, many theses defended by actual-sequence 
theorists, including of course Sartorio. With other incompatibilists, 
I think that many of the conditions for free will underlined by com-
patibilists are in fact necessary for it. But unlike compatibilists, I hold 
that there is at least another condition, namely open alternatives, that 
is also necessary for free will (and incompatible with determinism).
So, in order to bring to light the specificity of actual-sequence 
theories, Sartorio distinguishes two main claims that these theories 
make. The first is a positive claim: ‘(P) Freedom is grounded, at least 
partly, in actual sequences (and the grounds of actual sequences)’ 
(p. 20). This claim can be endorsed by many alternative-possibilities 
theorists, as I have indicated. So, the distinctive trait of actual-se-
quence theories is the negative claim: ‘(N) Freedom isn’t grounded 
in anything other than actual sequences (and the grounds of actual 
sequences)’ (p. 28). AP theorists may accept P, but they reject N. For 
them, open alternatives possibilities are also a ground of freedom, in 
addition to facts pertaining to the actual sequence.
A distinctive actual-sequence view of freedom
The most important distinctive feature of Sartorio’s theory of free-
dom, in contrast with other actual-sequence theories, such as Fischer 
and Ravizza’s (1998) or Frankfurt’s (1988), is that actual sequences 
are to be interpreted in causal terms, as causal sequences or histo-
ries. According to her,
[T]he agent’s freedom is grounded, not in the mere occurrence of cer-
tain events, but in the fact that certain events are connected in certain 
ways. More precisely, at least assuming a causalist picture of agency, the 
best interpretation of P [the positive claim] seems to be one according 
to which the agent’s freedom is grounded in certain causal facts. (p. 21)
So, actual sequences should be understood, in Sartorio’s proposal, as 
Even so-called classical compatibilists, such as Ayer (1954), who hold that alter-
native possibilities are both necessary for free will and compatible with determin-
ism, are plausibly interpreted as holding this view as well.
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actual causal sequences: ‘Actual sequences are just causal histories, 
across the board’ (p. 22). The negative claim N that an actual-se-
quence theory makes should therefore be interpreted, in the context 
of Sartorio’s proposal, in causal terms, namely as the claim that ‘free-
dom is a function of actual causes, and nothing else’ (p. 171). The 
central role of causation is, then, the distinctive trait that tells Sar-
torio’s theory apart from other actual-sequence theories of freedom.
Interpreted in causal terms, the negative claim N of an actual-
sequence theory implies a supervenience claim: ‘(S) An agent’s free-
dom with respect to S supervenes on the relevant elements of the 
causal sequence issuing in X (those that ground the agent’s freedom 
with respect to X)’ (p. 55). As she puts it in the form of a slogan: ‘No 
difference in freedom without a difference in the relevant elements 
of the causal sequence’ (p. 32). The supervenience claim is a central 
tenet of Sartorio’s theory.
Two preliminary, general critical remarks
The central place allotted to causation in Sartorio’s view gives me 
occasion for a first general critical remark. As it is known, some 
philosophers, such as those who think that human and social sci-
ences have a different conceptual and explanatory structure than 
natural sciences, and those who defend, in the line of Wittgenstein, 
the autonomy of the specifically human realm, have held that, in 
the context of human intentional and free action, the term ‘cause’ 
has a different meaning than in the natural realm, or even that it 
lacks application at all. Though not many, some important philoso-
phers (e.g. Carl Ginet 2002, 2008; Hugh McCann 1998; Stewart 
Goetz 2009) still defend and argue for the (rather old)4 doctrine that 
reasons explanations of action are not causal explanations and that 
reasons are not a species of causes. However, Sartorio assumes (e.g. 
p. 21) a causal theory of action and so presumably holds that these 
non-causal views are mistaken, that reasons explanations are causal 
and that reasons are (a species of) causes. I just would like to point 
4 Versions of this doctrine can be found in Wittgenstein himself, as well as in 
some of his followers, but precedents of it can be found in XIX century thinkers 
such as Droysen and Dilthey.
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out that Sartorio’s position in this respect is not obvious, but that it 
involves a substantial (and controversial) commitment, which I do 
not share. I am strongly inclined to stress the specificity of human 
agents and actions within the overall natural realm.
A second general critical remark concerns what Sartorio con-
siders as an important virtue of his view, namely ‘its boldness and 
simplicity’ (p. 171). I agree that its central thesis, i.e. that freedom 
is exclusively a function of actual causal facts, is bold and simple. 
However, the conceptual and dialectical apparatus that supports it 
is not similarly bold and simple. It is a subtle and complex view of 
causation, which includes such ideas as that omissions and other ab-
sences can be causes, or that causation is an extrinsic and intransitive 
relation. Though Sartorio rejects the idea that effects counterfactu-
ally depend on their causes, she holds that causes make a difference 
to their effects. All these theses about causation that underlie and 
support the main contention are controversial and deprive the over-
all theory of simplicity and boldness, Sartorio’s thorough defense of 
them notwithstanding.
Frankfurt cases
As Sartorio points out, actual-sequence theories of freedom and 
responsibility were motivated by reflection on so-called Frankfurt 
cases.5 These are conceptually possible situations in which an agent 
seems to decide and act freely, and be responsible for her decision 
and action, even if, unbeknownst to her, she could not have decided 
or acted otherwise. Here is a (rather standard) Frankfurt case:
LIE: Frank, a student, hates his colleague Furt and, after deliber-
ating, decides to lie to him about the exact time of an oncoming 
exam. As a result, Furt misses the exam, with quite nasty con-
sequences for him. Unbeknownst to Frank, Black, a malicious 
neuroscientist, who also wants Frank to lie to Furt, has implanted 
in Frank’s brain a device that allows him to witness Frank’s delib-
eration processes. If, on this basis, it becomes clear to Black that 
Frank is going to decide not to lie to Furt, he will press a spe-
5 The reason for this name is that cases of this sort were first designed by 
Frankfurt in his important and path-breaking 1969 paper.
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cial button that will stimulate the right brain centers and cause 
Frank’s decision to lie. However, Black prefers not to intervene 
unless it is strictly necessary. And in fact it is not, for Frank, de-
liberating on his own and for his own reasons, decides to lie, and 
lies, to Furt, while Black restricts himself to witnessing the pro-
cess without interfering in it at all. Frank deliberates and decides 
fully on his own.
In these circumstances, it seems that Frank has decided and acted 
freely and that he is morally responsible for his decision and action, 
as well as for their foreseeable outcomes. However, due to the lurk-
ing but inactive presence of Black, he is unable to decide and act 
otherwise. To dramatize a bit and get the example closer to the one 
Sartorio uses along her book, let us modify the example and suppose 
that Frank decides to shoot Furt and does shoot him. Again, Frank 
has decided and acted freely and is morally responsible for deciding 
to shoot and for shooting Furt, while having no open alternatives to 
such decision and action.
The reason that this sort of cases have motivated actual-sequence 
theories of freedom and responsibility is clear. Our intuitive judg-
ment in favor of Frank’s freedom and responsibility seems to depend 
exclusively on what happens in the actual sequence: on the fact that 
Frank deliberates and decides fully on his own and for his own rea-
sons. Instead, the fact that (owing to Black’s lurking presence) Frank 
lacks access to alternative decisions or actions looks irrelevant to his 
freedom and responsibility in deciding and acting as he does.
A common defense of the necessity of alternative possibilities for 
moral responsibility and free will has been to try to find some alter-
natives open to an agent in Frankfurt cases. But, as Sartorio rightly 
points out (pp. 14–15), finding alternatives of some sort is not suf-
ficient to defuse Frankfurt cases. In order to do so, the alternatives 
should help explain the agent’s freedom and responsibility for what 
he decides and does. In a term coined by Fischer (1994: 144), the al-
ternatives have to be robust. Suppose that we modify LIE by removing 
Black from the picture, so that Frank could have decided not to lie to 
Furt. As in the original example, Frank freely lies to Furt and is re-
sponsible, blameworthy in fact, for this lie. And what (at least partly) 
explains this blameworthiness is that it was in his power not to have 
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lied. This alternative, not lying, is then robust, or morally relevant. 
Now, Frank had other alternatives available to him. For example, 
he could have told the same lie with synonymous but slightly dif-
ferent words, or with a bit louder or lower tone of voice. However, 
the availability of these alternatives to Frank is not even part of the 
reason why he is blameworthy for lying to Furt. These alternatives 
are not robust. It would be useless to try to save an AP view against 
a Frankfurt counterexample by appealing to them.
It is important to note that an alternative is not robust for the 
mere fact that opting for it would exempt an agent from moral re-
sponsibility. To see this, imagine that, in LIE, Frank has in his pocket 
a candy that, fully unbeknownst to him, would make him feel very 
sick if he sucked it, with the consequence that he would forget about 
the lying. In these circumstances, Frank has an alternative that he 
can opt for at will and such that, if he chose it, he would not lie to 
Furt and therefore would not be blameworthy for lying. However, if 
he finally did not suck the candy, lied to Furt and was blameworthy 
for that, it was not because he could have chosen to suck the candy. 
Refraining from lying (though not available to Frank in LIE) is then 
a robust alternative, while sucking the candy is not.
Now, it seems pretty obvious that the alternatives required by an 
AP view should be of the robust variety. So, following Fischer, who 
was first to point to the condition of robustness, actual-sequence 
theorists rightly hold that the mere availability of alternatives in a 
Frankfurt case is not enough to vindicate an AP view: in order to 
achieve this result, these APs have to be robust.
Test cases
Among other theorists, Peter van Inwagen responded to Frankfurt 
and defended the necessity of alternatives in several ways. An impor-
tant step in Sartorio’s defense of her Actual Causal Sequence view 
(ACS in what follows) is her discussion, at several places in her book, 
of two pairs of cases that were originally designed by van Inwagen 
in order to defend an AP view. Not surprisingly, the cases seem to 
threaten (N) and (S) as well. The first pair of cases concern an omis-
sion. Consider the following example:
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Phones: I witness a man being robbed and beaten. I consider call-
ing the police. I could easily pick up the phone and call them. But I 
decide against it, out of a combination of fear and laziness (p. 56).
Now consider the following variation on Phones:
No Phones: Everything is the same as in Phones except that, 
unbeknownst to me, I couldn’t have called the police (the phone 
lines were down at the time) (p. 56).
In Phones, it seems right to say that I freely choose not to call the 
police and am responsible (blameworthy) for this omission, as well as 
for some of its foreseeable consequences. However, things look dif-
ferent in No Phones. Here I freely choose not to call the police and 
am responsible for that choice and for not trying to call the police, 
but, apparently, I am not either free to call the police, or responsible 
for not calling the police, in the sense of actually contacting them.
Now consider another pair of cases, which include an action, 
rather than an omission:
Not All Roads Lead to Rome: A man, Ryder, is riding a run-
away horse, Dobbin. Ryder can’t get Dobbin to stop but he can 
steer him in different directions with the bridle. When they ap-
proach a certain crossroads, Ryder realizes that only one of the 
roads leads to Rome. Ryder hates Romans, so he steers Dobbin in 
that direction so that some Romans are hurt by the passage of the 
runaway horse (p. 56).
In this example, Ryder has freely hurt the Romans and is respon-
sible for hurting them. Now consider the following variation of the 
example:
All Roads Lead to Rome: Everything is the same as in Not 
All Roads Lead to Rome except that, unbeknownst to Ryder, all 
roads lead to Rome (Ryder couldn’t have avoided the harm to the 
Romans) (p. 57).
Again, in Not All Roads Lead to Rome, Ryder has freely harmed 
the Romans and is responsible for the harm caused to them. In All 
Roads Lead to Rome, however, Ryder has freely decided to harm the 
Romans and is responsible for his decision, but, apparently, he is not 
responsible for the harm caused to the Romans.
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As Sartorio writes about both pairs of cases: ‘Intuitively, even if I 
am responsible for not trying to call the police in No Phones, I’m not 
responsible for not calling them. And even if Ryder is responsible for 
intending to harm the Romans in All Roads Lead to Rome, he’s not 
responsible for the harm itself’ (p. 57).
My intuitions about these cases are somehow more wavering. 
However, I would tend to agree with Sartorio if we describe what 
agents are responsible for as follows: in No Phones, I am not respon-
sible for not contacting the police, in the sense of talking to them 
and reporting about the incident, and so for the fact that they are 
not alerted; and, with more hesitation, in All Roads Lead to Rome, 
Ryder is not responsible for the fact that some Romans are harmed, 
though maybe I would prefer to say that he is not responsible for not 
avoiding the harm to the Romans. I am less sure about my lack of 
responsibility for omitting to call the police and about Ryder’s lack 
of responsibility for harming the Romans. The reason is that, in No 
Phones, my omission was voluntary and willing, while it would have 
been involuntary and against my will if I had picked up the phone 
and dialed the police number; and, in All Roads, Ryder’s harming 
the Romans was also voluntary and willing, while it would have been 
unwilling if he had steered Dobbin towards the road which he (false-
ly) believed did not lead to Rome. These distinctions are important 
and we’ll come back to them later on, but let us leave them aside for 
the moment and focus on the objects of non-responsibility as I have 
described them.
Explaining differences
Why am I responsible for not contacting the police in Phones but not 
in No Phones? The most obvious answer is that I could have contact-
ed them in the former scenario, but not in the latter. And something 
similar holds for Ryder’s responsibility for the harm in either sce-
nario. This is the response of the AP theorist and it has a good deal 
of plausibility. In No Phones (unlike Phones) I am not responsible for 
not contacting the police because I couldn’t have contacted them. 
And in All Roads (unlike Not All Roads) Ryder is not responsible for 
(not avoiding) the harm because he could not have avoided it. Neither 
Ryder nor I had any open alternatives in one of the cases, and this 
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lack of alternative possibilities (of plural control, in Kane’s terms) 
explains our lack of freedom and responsibility.
If this explanation is correct, and the relevant causal facts are the 
same in both cases of each pair, this will refute Sartorio’s ACS, for 
then there will be a difference in freedom and responsibility between 
the two cases of each pair without a difference in causal facts. Appar-
ently, there is no such causal difference. In both Not All Roads and 
All Roads, Ryder’s hatred for the Romans leads him to steer Dobbin 
towards the same road to Rome, which in turn causes the harm to 
the Romans. And in both Phones and No Phones, my fear and lazi-
ness make me to refrain from calling the police, which in turn leads 
to the police’s not being alerted.
However, with the aid of her theory of causation, Sartorio argues 
(cf. pp. 68 ff.) that, against appearances, there is a difference in caus-
al facts. In Phones, my fear and laziness cause my omission to call the 
police, which in turn causes my failure to contact the police and the 
fact that they are not alerted. However, in No Phones, given that the 
phone lines are down, my fear and laziness do not cause neither my 
not contacting the police nor the fact that they are not alerted. Less 
clear is for me the explanation of the difference between Not All 
Roads and All Roads, as I will argue shortly.
If ACS has an alternative explanation of the difference in freedom 
in terms of a difference in causal facts, these pairs of cases do not 
refute the theory. But it is worth pointing out that this alternative 
explanation requires controversial assumptions about causation, such 
as that absences (like phone lines’ not being in order) can be causes 
and that causation is an extrinsic relation, in the sense that, in Sar-
torio’s characterization of this property, ‘[a] causal relation between 
C and E may obtain, in part, due to factors that are extrinsic to the 
causal process linking C and E’ (p. 71). So, in Phones, my fear and 
laziness cause my not contacting the police because the phone lines 
are in order, a factor that is extrinsic to that causal relation. Instead, 
in No Phones, my fear and laziness do not cause my not contacting 
the police because the phone lines are down, an extrinsic factor that 
prevents the causal relation from obtaining.
These features of Sartorio’s theory of causation, I have said, are 
contentious. This can be seen, in my opinion, when an explanation 
similar to that given for Phones and No Phones is intended to apply 
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to the other pair of cases, Not All Roads and All Roads. About this 
pair, Sartorio writes:
In both cases Ryder steers Dobbin in a certain direction, and in both 
cases some Romans are hurt by the runaway horse. But, arguably, we 
don’t have the same causal connections between these events in both 
cases: Ryder’s act of steering Dobbin results in some Romans being 
harmed only when not all roads lead to Rome. (p. 71)
I must confess that I cannot see why, in All Roads, Ryder’s act of 
steering Dobbin in the same direction as in Not All Roads does not 
causally result in some Romans being harmed. It is intuitively ob-
vious for me that the steering causally results in the harm in both 
cases. Sartorio can argue that, in Not All Roads, the causal relation 
between the steering and the harm obtains due to the extrinsic fact 
that only one road leads to Rome. However, I cannot see why, in All 
Roads, the causal relation between the steering and the harm does 
not obtain due to the extrinsic fact that both roads lead to Rome. 
The causal relation seems to obtain in both cases, at least on a natu-
ral view of causation in terms of a productive sequence. A similar, 
continuous series of temporally and causally related events leads to 
the harm in both cases.6 I take this to be an important problem for 
Sartorio’s ACS theory of freedom, as well as for her view of causa-
tion, on which the former rests.7 There seems to be here an impor-
6 Sartorio refers to this understanding of causation and causal histories: ‘It is 
quite natural to think of the causal history of an event X as the sequence consist-
ing of (in reverse order) the immediate causes of X, the causes of those causes, 
and so on’ (p. 105). However, she recommends the view ‘according to which the 
causal history of X includes only the elements of that sequence that cause X’ (p. 
105). She seems to hold that only the immediate causes of X are part of the causal 
history of X. I do not see any clear reasons for preferring this strange, restricted 
understanding of the causal history of an event to the broader conception except 
for the contribution it makes to some contentions that favor ACS, such as that the 
causal histories of All Roads and Not All Roads are different (cf. p. 106).
7 Sartorio can argue that, in All Roads, the steering does not cause the harm 
owing to another property of causation, namely that causes make a difference to 
their effects: ‘[C]auses are difference-makers in that they make a contribution 
that their absences wouldn’t have make’ (p. 94). Since in All Roads the steering 
does not make a difference (it results in the harm anyway), it is not the cause of 
the harm. Later on, however, I will argue, on the basis of a broad conception of 
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tant asymmetry between omissions and actions which would deserve 
attention.
Assuming (at least provisionally and for the sake of argument) 
that Ryder is not responsible for the harm in All Roads, the AP theo-
rist has an explanation of this fact in the same terms as her expla-
nation of my non-responsibility for not contacting the police in No 
Phones, namely that Ryder could not have avoided the harm. The 
lack of alternatives or plural control over the outcome explains the 
agent’s lack of responsibility in both No Phones and All Roads. This 
unitary explanation seems to speak in favor of an AP view against an 
actual-sequence view like ACS.
Digging deeper into the dialectic
A difference between Phones and No Phones has to do with moral 
luck, of the kind Nagel (1979) calls ‘circumstantial’. In No Phones 
I am not responsible for not contacting the police, but this is due to 
mere (good) luck, because whether phone lines were or not in order 
wasn’t under my control. In Phones I am responsible for that, but 
again due to (bad) luck. Sartorio is certainly aware of the presence 
of luck in these examples, and makes subtle remarks that involve 
types of moral luck as well as the distinction between omissions and 
actions. I will not get into this (no doubt interesting) aspect of her 
work. However, if freedom is mainly a matter of control and luck is 
essentially a matter of lack of control, it would help clarify things and 
adjudicate between AP and ACS views of freedom if we could reduce 
the role of luck in our test examples.
A way of reducing the influence of luck is to restrict the examples 
to the agents’ freedom and responsibility for their decision or choice, 
leaving aside the ‘external’ part of the process, which is (partly) be-
yond their control.8 In both Phones and No Phones, I decide not to 
causal histories, for the view that there is an important difference between the 
actual and the counterfactual sequence of All Roads, which involves alternative 
possibilities and affects Ryder’s freedom and moral responsibility.
8 It is worth pointing out that, in recent debates about alternative possibilities, 
moral responsibility and Frankfurt cases, it is common to restrict the discussion 
about the freedom and responsibility of agents to decisions or choices, rather than 
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call the police (out of a combination of fear and laziness). In both Not 
All Roads and All Roads, Ryder decides to steer the runaway horse 
towards the road he believes leads to Rome. In both pairs of cases, I 
submit, the AP theorist and the ACS theorist agree that the decision 
is free, and the agent is responsible for it, though they differ as to the 
grounding and explanation of this freedom and responsibility.
Two important considerations follow from this restriction of 
freedom and responsibility to choices and decisions, rather than 
overt actions and external outcomes.
First, once we restrict the examples in this way, leaving aside 
what does not depend on the agent, we see that there is an impor-
tant criterion of moral assessment that gives the same result in both 
cases; the criterion is of the sort that Watson (2004: 266, 268) called 
‘aretaic’, which guides judgments about an agent’s moral virtue and 
is, according to him, a ‘face’ of responsibility (‘attributability’). It is 
pretty clear that, from this ‘aretaic’ point of view, the point of view 
of my moral virtue, I am not better or worse in Phones than in No 
Phones, and that Ryder is not better or worse in Not All Roads than 
in All Roads. Ryder and I do not deserve a positive assessment in 
moral terms.
Second, responsibility has also, according again to Watson (cf. 
2004: 273 ff.), an ‘accountability’ face or aspect, which has to do 
with questions of desert, blame- and praiseworthiness. It is this face 
of responsibility that Sartorio is mainly concerned with. With re-
spect to accountability for decisions and choices in our test cases, 
both the ACS and the AP theorists accept that, in both Phones and 
No Phones, I am responsible for my decision or choice not to call 
the police and, assuming my fear and laziness were not irresistible, 
they also agree that this decision was free. And, mutatis mutandis, 
the same goes for Ryder’s decision in both Not All Roads and All 
Roads. How do these theorists explain this freedom and responsibil-
ity? For brevity reasons, let us restrict our comments to the Phones/
No Phones pair. ACS appeals to the fact that the choice has the right 
kind of causal history (I’m not manipulated, nor forced to fail to call, 
etc.; my decision was due to ordinary psychological states, fear and 
laziness, and to the reasons corresponding to them), and this is all 
open actions. I simply follow here this almost general assumption.
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that my free decision is grounded in and supervenes on. What about 
the AP theorist? Well, he may willingly accept that the factors the 
ACS theorist resorts to partly explain why I freely decided not to call 
the police and am responsible for that decision, but he insists that 
there is an additional explanatory condition, namely that I could (and 
should) have chosen or decided to call. I freely decided not to call 
and am responsible (blameworthy) for that decision partly because 
I could (and should) have chosen otherwise. We have, apparently a 
stalemate. Both parties have an explanation of my freedom in choos-
ing or deciding not to call. Part of it is common to both, but they 
differ in that the ACS theorist holds that this common part is all that 
freedom is grounded in, while the AP theorist insist that there is an 
additional grounding factor, namely my ability to decide otherwise. 
Can this stalemate be broken? I’ll try to do it in a way that is clearly 
not unfair to the ACS theorist, namely by examining a case where 
the agent seems to decide freely and be responsible for this decision 
while having no alternative decision available.
No alternative decision
Let us modify No Phones in the sense that, in the same way as, in the 
original example, I could not have contacted the police, now I could 
not have even decided or chosen to call them. Suppose that things 
are as they are in the original example: I decide not to call out of fear 
and laziness, etc. But suppose that, had I seriously considered calling 
the police, presumably for moral considerations, I would have found 
myself unable to make the decision to call because of an outbreak of 
intense anxiety and irresistible fear. The actual decision seems to be 
free and I seem to be responsible for it even if I could not have made 
an alternative decision. Here an actual-sequence theory of freedom, 
perhaps in the form of Sartorio’s ACS, seems to win the contest. 
What about the AP theorist? Strictly speaking, he seems to have to 
say that my decision was not free, owing to my lack of an alternative 
decision. But this looks counterintuitive and it seems he just assumes 
the necessity of alternatives, which is what is at issue, so risking to 
beg the question against the actual-sequence theorist. It seems he 
should agree that I made the decision not to call and contact the po-
lice freely and am responsible for it, even if I could not have decided 
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to call them. But then he appears to lose the game and the stalemate 
seems to be broken in favor of an actual-sequence theory like ACS.
But is it really broken in this direction?
The AP theorist will accept that I could not have chosen other-
wise and, nevertheless, I seem to have chosen freely and be respon-
sible for that decision. However, he still has some resources at his 
disposal in order to defend his view.
To begin with, he can appeal to the following, intuitively true 
principle, which arguably underlies our ascriptions of moral respon-
sibility. It may be called ‘Doing One’s Best, Obligation and Blame-
worthiness’ (DOB):
DOB: If someone does her reasonable best in order to behave in 
a morally right way, she is not morally obligated to do better, and 
so is not blameworthy for not doing better.9
Note that from this principle it doesn’t logically follow that if some-
one does not do her reasonable best in order to behave in a morally 
right way, then she is morally obligated to do better and is blame-
worthy for not doing better.10 However, the fact that someone does 
not do her reasonable best in order to behave decently creates a 
presumption in favor of her blameworthiness. The principle seems 
eminently correct. It looks clearly unfair to blame someone who has 
done all her reasonable best in order to behave in a morally right way.
Armed with this principle, let us go back to the modified No 
Phones, where I cannot make the decision to call the police. I make 
my actual decision due to a combination of fear and laziness, and 
to the reasons associated with these psychological states. Intuitively, 
my decision is free and I am blameworthy for it. Moreover, I had 
no alternative decision available. Does this imply that the AP view 
is false? I don’t think so. In the example, I did not satisfy the (first) 
antecedent of DOB. I did not do my reasonable best in order to act in 
a morally decent way: even if I could not have decided to call, I could 
have tried to decide to call by trying (unsuccessfully) to overcome 
9 I have offered related versions of this principle in Moya 2011 and 2014.
10 This is as it should be, for otherwise our responsibility would extend be-
yond reasonable limits, since it often happens that, even if we do well, we could 
have done even better.
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my fear and laziness. I had a morally significant alternative to my 
decision not to call the police, namely to try to call them by trying 
to overcome my fear and laziness. Had I gone for this alternative, I 
would have satisfied the (first) antecedent of DOB, for I would have 
done my reasonable best in order to behave decently; therefore, I 
would not have been obligated to do better, namely to decide to call 
the police, and would not have been blameworthy for not deciding 
to call. And we can apply this to the freedom of my decision: even if 
I could not have decided otherwise, I decided freely partly because I 
had a significant alternative: I could have tried to decide otherwise.
So, the AP theorist can accept that I freely decided not to call and 
am responsible for that decision even if I could not have decided to 
call, but reply that I had a relevant alternative to that decision: in this 
context, trying to decide to call by overcoming my fear and laziness 
becomes a relevant alternative, not just to not trying, but also to not 
deciding, or to failing to decide. We judge my decision as free and 
consider myself blameworthy for it, first because I made it myself, 
for ordinary psychological states and for my own reasons, but also 
because we feel that I could have done better, that I didn’t try hard 
enough to do the right thing, even if my trying would have been un-
successful at the end. This alternative is, then, robust.
I think that, when we judge that my decision not to call the police 
was free and that I am responsible for it, what explains this judgment 
is not only what the ACS theorist points to, namely that the decision 
had the right antecedents and history, etc. but also that I could have 
done reasonably better in moral terms and did not do it. That this 
alternative is robust, explanatorily relevant, strongly suggests that it 
also grounds the freedom of my decision and my responsibility for 
it. We can also argue for the explanatory and grounding character 
of this alternative by removing it: suppose that I was simply unable 
to make any effort to overcome my laziness and fear and to decide 
to call the police, maybe because I was completely morally blind, or 
perhaps for reasons related to a deeply defective will. I submit that, 
in that case, we would tend to deny my character as a free and mor-
ally responsible agent and, a fortiori, the freedom of my decision and 
my responsibility for it.
So, the mere fact that I am free and responsible for deciding that 
p and that I was unable to decide otherwise doesn’t refute the AP 
Carlos J. Moya184
view of freedom and responsibility, for in that case the relevant AP 
becomes trying to decide otherwise. Trying to decide otherwise may 
amount to different things in different contexts. In our example, it 
amounts to making an effort to overcome my laziness and fear in 
order to choose the right thing, namely calling the police.
Some consequences for the original test cases
The preceding reflections allow us to contemplate our original test 
cases, No Phones and All Roads, under a new perspective. We have 
agreed that, both in the actual and in the alternative sequences of 
both cases, the outcome is the same. In No Phones, the police is not 
alerted; in All Roads, some Romans are hurt. But now we can go 
back to the agent’s reasons and choice.
Consider No Phones. I assume that the phone lines are in order 
and that I can contact and alert the police. Nevertheless, I choose 
not to pick up the phone. This choice is free, and I could have chosen 
otherwise. So, my omission or failure to pick up the phone and dial 
the police number was the fulfilment of a free decision and it was a 
free omission itself. In the alternative sequence, I choose to call the 
police, pick up the phone and dial the police number, only to realize 
that the line is out of order. In both sequences, I fail to contact the po-
lice and the police is not alerted. However, in the actual sequence my 
failure is a voluntary omission; it is the fulfilment of a free decision 
not to call, is itself free and I am responsible for it. In the alternative 
sequence, my failure is not a free omission; it is the consequence of 
an external state of affairs; it goes against my decision to contact the 
police; it is not free and I am not responsible for it. So, in the actual 
sequence there is a voluntary omission, for which I am responsible, 
blameworthy in fact, but I could have done otherwise: I could have 
tried to contact the police. Had I tried, I would not have been blame-
worthy for the omission for which I am actually responsible. And the 
fact that I did not even try partly explains my blameworthiness; it is 
then a significant, robust alternative to my free omission.
It remains the fact that the outcomes of both sequences of No 
Phones are apparently the same: in both cases, the police is not alert-
ed. The AP theorist should say that I am not responsible for this 
outcome, shouldn’t he? But the outcomes in both sequences are the 
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same only under a physical description, so to speak. In the actual se-
quence this outcome corresponds to the intentional object of my free 
decision not to contact the police. It is what would have happened 
even if the phone lines had been in order. In the alternative sequence, 
it conflicts with the intentional object of my decision to contact the 
police. It would not have taken place if the lines had not been down. 
This difference gives the outcome in the actual and the alternative 
sequence a very different significance, from the point of view of my 
freedom and responsibility for it.
What about All Roads Lead to Rome? Some Romans are hurt in 
both sequences, but in the actual sequence they are hurt by Ryder, 
whereas in the alternative sequence it would be more exact to say 
that they are hurt by Dobbin, the horse. They are hurt, not by, but in 
spite of, Ryder. In the actual sequence, Ryder decides to steer Dob-
bin towards what he takes to be the only road that leads to Rome in 
order to hurt Roman people, and he fulfils his decision. His hurting 
Romans is free and he is responsible for it, but he had a robust, sig-
nificant alternative, namely to hurt them against his will and deci-
sion by choosing to take the other road, which, in his perspective, 
did not lead to Rome.
As for the outcomes themselves, again they are the same in both 
sequences only from a physical perspective. In the actual sequence, 
the outcome, namely that some Romans are hurt, is the willed con-
sequence of a free decision to hurt Romans. In the alternative se-
quence, the outcome is the involuntary consequence of a free deci-
sion not to hurt Romans. From this perspective, I tend to say that the 
difference is significant enough to say that Ryder is responsible for 
the fact that some Romans are hurt in the actual sequence, though 
not in the alternative sequence. In the actual sequence, he freely and 
willingly hurts Romans; that Romans are hurt is the fulfilment of 
his free decision to hurt Romans. However, he had an alternative: 
to choose the other road, which he falsely believed did not lead to 
Rome. In that case, though some Romans would have been hurt any-
way, they would not have been hurt by him, but by Dobbin, so to 
speak; not by him, but in spite of him.
Again, when we tend to blame Ryder for hurting some Romans, 
we do it partly because we feel that he did not do his reasonable best 
to behave in a morally decent way. Ryder acted freely partly because 
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he had robust, morally significant alternatives, and we take this fact 
into account when we judge him responsible for hurting Romans and 
even for the fact that some Romans are hurt. Open alternative pos-
sibilities seem to ground freedom and responsibility, together with 
other factors.
But the dialectic about these matters is certainly subtle and intri-
cate. To witness, if the ACS theorist were to agree with this diagnosis 
of Ryder’s freedom and responsibility, she still would have resources 
to account for it. She could say that the difference in Ryder’s freedom 
and responsibility between the actual and the alternative sequences 
of All Roads is due to the fact that the respective causal histories are 
different. More specifically, she would point to a property of causa-
tion, namely that causes make a difference to their effects.11 That Ryder 
hurts Romans as a causal result of his reasons and decision to hurt 
them is not the same thing as that he hurts them as a result of the 
fact that both roads lead to Rome. Fair enough. But now I would like 
to argue that this difference that ‘causes’ make in human action is a 
difference of the kind that involves alternative possibilities of action. 
In other words, what Ryder does in the actual and in the alternative 
sequences are different kinds of action. In order to show this, it will be 
convenient to return to Frankfurt cases and, more specifically, to 
the case of Frank and Furt.
Revisiting Frankfurt cases
Remember the case of Frank and Furt. Frank hates Furt and decides 
on his own and for his own reasons to shoot him. He fulfills his de-
cision and Furt dies as a result of being shot by Frank. Remember 
that there is also Black, the neuroscientist who witnesses Frank’s 
deliberation. If Black sees that Frank is going to decide not to shoot 
Furt, he will stimulate his brain so that Frank will anyway decide to 
shoot Furt and fulfill his decision. We have apparently a case where 
Frank makes a free decision to shoot Furt and shoots him, is morally 
responsible for such a decision and action and, nonetheless, could 
11 As Sartorio puts it: ‘Difference-Making (Causes): Causes make a difference to 
their effects in that the effects wouldn’t have been caused by the absence of their 
causes’ (p. 94).
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not have decided or acted otherwise. Either he decides to shoot, and 
shoots, Furt on his own and for his own reasons or he does it because 
of Black’s intervention. In the latter case, of course, Frank will not 
decide and act freely nor will he be responsible for his decision and 
action. However, since Black never intervenes, it seems that Frank 
decides and acts freely, as he would if Black had not existed, and he is 
responsible for choosing to shoot Furt and for shooting Furt, as well 
as for his death.
The ACS theorist holds that Frank acts freely in virtue of the 
actual causal history of his action. The actual causes of his decision 
and action, namely his reasons for shooting Furt, make nonetheless 
a difference, though not a difference in terms of alternative decisions 
and actions. Sartorio writes, for instance:
Again, imagine that Frank decides to shoot Furt out of a desire for 
revenge (to avenge some earlier deed by Furt). If he hadn’t been moved 
by a desire for revenge, the neuroscientist would have intervened by 
forcing him to make the choice to shoot Furt anyway. Still, the contri-
bution made by the desire and the absence of the desire are intuitively 
not on a par: intuitively, the desire makes a contribution to Frank’s 
choice that the absence of the desire wouldn’t have made. (p. 132)
As I anticipated, I think that the difference that Frank’s reasons 
make, as compared to their absence and the corresponding inter-
vention of the neuroscientist, is a difference in the kind of action that 
Frank performs. In the actual sequence, where Frank decides to 
shoot Furt and shoots him freely, on his own and for his own rea-
sons, Frank murders Furt. In the alternative sequence, where Frank’s 
decision is caused by Black’s intervention in his brain, Frank does not 
murder Furt; at most, he merely causes his death, which is something 
very different from the point of view of ascriptions of freedom and 
responsibility. Initially, then, Frank seems to have an alternative ac-
tion open to him: he murders Furt, but could have avoided murdering 
him. He could not have avoided Furt’s death, but could have avoided 
that the death was the result of a murdering by him.
It might be objected that, since Frank is unaware of Black’s lurking 
presence, the alternative of merely causing Furt’s death, as opposed 
to murdering him, is not something he can properly choose or decide 
to do, and so it is not robust enough to ground his responsibility for 
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murdering Furt. And, of course, the robust alternative of choosing 
or deciding not to shoot Furt is not open to him, owing to the pres-
ence of Black. Merely causing Furt’s death would be the unexpect-
ed consequence of his showing the sign that would have prompted 
Black’s intervention.
We can respond to this objection as follows. Suppose that the sign 
that alerts Black and brings about his intervention is very tiny, say 
Frank’s taking seriously into account moral reasons for not shooting 
Furt and considering not to shoot him. In the actual sequence, Frank 
does not take these reasons seriously into account and Black remains 
inactive. Of course, without Black’s presence this mental act would 
not have exempted Frank from responsibility, since it is perfectly 
compatible with his deciding at the end to shoot Furt in spite of those 
reasons. However, once Black gets in the picture, this mental act is 
the best that Frank can do in order to decide and act in a morally 
decent way. Remember DOB:
DOB: If someone does her reasonable best in order to behave in 
a morally right way, she is not morally obligated to do better, and 
so is not blameworthy for not doing better.
Given the situation Frank is in, where, owing to Black’s lurking pres-
ence, he cannot decide not to shoot Furt nor can he avoid shooting 
him, the best he reasonably can do, in order to behave in a morally 
decent way, is to take moral reasons seriously into account and con-
sider not to shoot Furt, which would have triggered Black’s interven-
tion. So, if he had done this, he would not have been blameworthy 
for not deciding not to shoot Furt, or for deciding to shoot him. In 
the context of the Frankfurt case, this tiny mental act becomes an 
alternative that would have exempted Frank from blameworthiness.
The question is now whether this exempting alternative would 
have been robust enough to ground and explain, at least partly, 
Frank’s actual freedom and responsibility for shooting and murder-
ing Furt. I think the answer is affirmative. Why do we take Frank 
to have shot Furt freely and to be responsible for doing it? Again, I 
agree with the actual-sequence theorist and with the compatibilist 
that part of the explanation lies in the actual history of Frank’s ac-
tion: his acting unforced, for his own reasons, his deciding to shoot 
Furt for those reasons, etc. But I contend that, in addition to this, we 
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consider him free and blameworthy because we feel that he did not 
do his best to behave in a morally decent way and that he should and 
could have done better than he did. If this is correct, then the alter-
native possibility of doing better, which in this context only amounts 
to his taking moral reasons for not shooting Furt seriously and con-
sidering not to shoot him, partly grounds and explains Frank’s free-
dom and moral responsibility for shooting and murdering Furt.
Final remarks
An additional and important consideration, which connects with a 
previous critical remark about the role of causation in human in-
tentional action, is the following. As we have seen, whether Frank’s 
action has as their ‘causal’ antecedents his reasons, or instead a de-
cision prompted by Black’s manipulation of Frank’s brain, changes 
the nature of that action, from murdering Furt to merely causing 
his death. But if we accept that causal relations are external, in the 
sense that being in a causal relation does not change the nature of the 
events so related, then this strongly suggests that reasons may not be 
causes of the decisions and actions they are reasons for, since they are 
internally related, in that their relation determines the nature and 
type of the performed action.
The difference we have pointed to, between Frank’s murdering 
Furt and merely causing his death, in virtue of their respective his-
tories, is especially salient, in that it has a reflection in language. But 
here we deal with concepts, not just language. This means that the 
difference remains even in cases where we do not have specific words 
or expressions to apply to what one does voluntarily and involun-
tarily. This happens, for example, in No Phones and All Roads Lead 
to Rome. We don’t have specifically coined terms or expressions to 
distinguish my failing to call the police in the actual and the alterna-
tive sequence, though we have the concepts and can express them by 
means of periphrases. And the same goes for All Roads: in the actual 
sequence, Ryder’s hurting the Romans is a voluntary and free action, 
whereas, in the alternative sequence, it is an unwanted accident.
As a general conclusion of what precedes, I hope to have plausibly 
contended that the AP theorist has important resources in defense of 
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his position against actual-sequence and ACS theorists.12
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